Friday, April 24, 2009

Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Part 4)

My reason for including this series of posts is to offer philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's model as a way of thinking about the ethics that I suspect are implicitly guiding our discussions about individualism, community, freedom, rights, and so on. MacIntyre in an earlier book defines a practice as:

Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and the human conceptions of the ends and good involved, are systematically extended. (After Virtue 187)

In other words, ethical understanding arises out of a particular practice pursued by a group, which further defines the understanding as the practices grows and shapes itself over time. Looking at ethics from a practice-based understanding calls for paying attention to the context of actions, as well as the worldview that gives meaning to the actions.

I would argue that we can't really discuss negative or positive versions of freedom without asking what freedom is for. If human free will is, as Colin Gunton defines it, "in large measure what we make of our particularity . . . what you and I do, or would do, as distinctly ourselves, and not as someone else" (The One, The Three, and the Many 62), that particularity can neither be submerged in a collectivist vision, such as that of communism, nor in a purely libertarian vision of unfettered selves, whihc are free from others' influence, and still remain authenticly Christian.

As Gunton puts it, "There is no true freedom which does not also allow for the fact that we are passive as well as active in relation to others and the world: we are what we are in perichoretic reciprocity" (170). That last lovely phrase means that our very personhood, while individual, is also intertwined in a logic of love that is ever giving and receiving everything from language to culture to wealth to beauty. To insist on being an autonomous self is to return to the fall of Adam and Eve with its terrible introductions of division between God and humans, between humans and each other, between people and nature, and even to the self-deception that divides us from true self-knowledge.

12 comments:

  1. These are excellent insights, but I don't know if I understand their main point in order to be able to respond. I probably misunderstand what the point is.

    Doesn't the meaning of 'ethical understanding arises out of a particular practice pursued by a group' become that the 'ethical understanding' is subjective? I would propose instead an objective standard for any ethical understanding - the sanctity of each(!) human life.

    I am not sure I see the basis expressed as fact in a number of your posts for these types of statements, "freedom must occur in social settings" or "human free will [cannot be submerged] in a purely libertarian vision of unfettered selves". You have made a good case for a biblical basis for such claims. Are O'Donovan and Gunter using similar biblical reasons to arrive at their claims?

    If these statements are claimed as self-evident truth, then the opponent could just respond with his own self-evident truth - "the concept of individual freedom cannot possibly be viewed in terms of social good, since that would change the object of study". Shouldn't the forceful claims of O'Donovan and Gunter be backed by some objective reasons for those claims?

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  2. Both O'Donovan and Gunter as theologians have mounted biblical cases to back what they are saying, though they also argue from historical theology and the example of the church over the centuries. MacIntyre, as a philosopher--though a believing one: after "After Virtue," he converted to the RCC and now teaches at U of Notre Dame--doesn't seek to make a biblical case, but rather a philosophical one.

    MacIntyre believes in something like an objective order of truth, though he's sometimes charged with subjectivism. If I understand him, he insists that that objective order is always "incarnated" (my word, not his) in specific social practices. The objective examples are the millions of clubs, orchestras, jazz combos, baseball teams, voluntary associations, and churches that have and observe some kind of long-term pursuit of an understood goal.

    The heart of all this is defining what the goal of freedom--what do you think of Gunter's definition, btw?--is to be. A purely negative model of freedom as being free from others' claims or interference does assume a positive purpose--something like the unfettered pursuit of one's own personal ends albeit without impinging on another's pursuit except by consent. What I'm contending is that this end of freedom by itself runs counter to the Christian vision. Perhaps we should ask what wealth is for? I think the weight of the biblical vision is shalom.

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  3. I actually like Gunton's (I misspelled him as Gunter earlier) definition of the free will as "what we make of our particularity". I would typically think of freedom (is that the same thing as free will?) as 'the ability to make choices voluntarily and suffer their consequences', which would imply that as humans we would express our particularity through those choices.

    Do we really have to ask what freedom is for? Do we have to ask what wealth is for? I don't think we necessarily do. For exhortation I think these can be useful questions; however, I don't see the point of asking those questions beyond exhortation or education. What do you think?

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  4. I'm not sure I follow what the opposite of exhortation is--"acceptable status quo"?

    By asking what freedom and wealth are for we are suggesting that there can be wrong uses of both, that not every choice or use of wealth is good, just, or healthy. And if we hold that there are wrong uses, then we can ask if one should go about ceasing from those uses or seeking to convinve others to do so as well. Am I answering your question?

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  5. I did not have in mind to look at the opposite of exhortation. By bringing up exhortation, I meant to consider why we would ask questions "what is wealth for?" or "is freedom being used for good purposes?" Asking these questions for exhortation or education purposes is wonderful. I bring these questions up in the classes that I teach, as well as in my parenting or Bible teaching opportunities. I stand ready to defend my use of wealth or freedom to those who may question it similarly, and I may even be convinced by them that I am using mine wrongly.

    I entirely accept your statement that there are wrong uses for freedom or wealth. But I see a great need to further distinguish two categories. Objectively(!) wrong uses for freedom and wealth (although I would define those 'wrong uses' much narrower than you since I would name in this category only uses that intentionally infringe on other's right to their own life) and subjectively wrong uses. I would place in the latter category uses of which I subjectively disapprove, but that do not intentionally harm others. (allowing a child to watch tv all day, smoking, having relations with same gender, committing suicide - to name a few things of which I disapprove subjectively.)

    Can we ask that 'one should go about ceasing from those uses or seeking to convinve others to do so as well'? In the category of objectively wrong uses of wealth or freedom not only 'we can' ask the offender to cease, but we must, justifiably using force and coercion if necessary. In the category of subjectively wrong uses of health and freedom we can also, to use your word, 'ask' that the offender cease, but in this case we must stop at asking; force is not justified, since the other person has the freedom, the right, to do what he deems fit for his own life. God has given him the freedom to choose right or choose wrong, and I ought not put myself in the place of a 'freedom-limiter'.

    Do you accept my distinction of the two categories of 'wrong uses of wealth or freedom'?

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  6. This helps explain a key difference in our use of terms. In the fields I tend to work in, your "objective" would be termed "public," while your "subjective" would be termed "private" or perhaps domestic. In my fields, we tend to use objective to refer to the claim that certain objects, truths, forces, and so on are really there and separate from our perception of them, while subjective refers to claims that are personal to the perceiver. Sometimes this is called the fact-value dichotomy. There are numerous problems with this, though in general I think one can speak of subjective experience and an objective existence that our experience may or may not perceive.

    The public/private split is also one that while necessary is problematic at points, though I do agree that we have to able to some way distinguish actions that require governmental force and those that should be free of it. In this country, the porblem of privitization has had a strong negative impact on Christians, as well as other relgious groups. We are expected too often still to submit to what Richard John Neuhaus called "a naked public square" in whcih our religious convictions are not allowed. (I would prefer a principled pluralism.)

    For example, all the things you mention--"allowing a child to watch tv all day, smoking, having relations with same gender, committing suicide"-- have a public impact on other members of the family, community, organization, and so on. With the exception of the last one--after all whom would you punish?--, I think a case can be made to make a law against them, though the first example would better be simply treated as evidence against parents guilty of criminal neglect in certain cases. I would not want to see the government monitoring tv use. However, I am at least sympathetic with treating same-sex intercourse as harmful to the public, though again whether there ought to be an enforceable law is another question.

    Some might charge that your very definition of "objective" and "subjective" here already makes large metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the world. Why should certain actions that can be shown only in a physical way to cause harm be judged as "objective"?

    To be honest, I suspect we may even have fundamental disagreements as to what a "right" is. It would be worth exploring more. Would you conisder doing a main post that defines your position on what a right is, especially of the political and economic varieties? I'd love to see what we can come up with here.

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  7. Oh, also, my main post on whether a Christian college is a community touches on my view of what a "public" is, as well as what a Christian community should be like.

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  8. " Why should certain actions that can be shown only in a physical way to cause harm be judged as "objective"? "

    There is a good reason why this is the case. The reason is that things that an individual does that do not harm others should be his prerogative to do, whether or not society approves of them. Those things are "subjective" (perhaps even - objectively subjective) since it is clear that one's approval or condemnation of them would depend on one's beliefs about metaphysical reality; beliefs that differ from person to person.

    I do believe that there are some things that are objective, not many things, and one of them is that each person alone has a right to his own life, so it is not right for others to dictate to him how to live, unless the others are being robbed of their own lives as a result of the first's actions.

    Do you have another standard for objectivity? What would be your rule of decision for saying that a particular use of wealth is so objectively wrong that the society has the right to force the individual to stop a particular behavior? Some principle or decision rule is necessary, isn't it?

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  9. "The reason is that things that an individual does that do not harm others should be his prerogative to do, whether or not society approves of them."

    A very metaphysical claim, indeed. :D How can you come to such a conclusion without certain claims about the nature of humanity, the world, and God? To argue that each individual has a right to his own life is already to make value-based claims about all three of these. Can we really face God with the Rosseau-esque claim that "I had a right to my own life"?

    As to objectivity/subjectivity, I find such a division pretty problematic, to be honest. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle and all that.

    I would return to an understanding of varying spheres of life and varying communities--I am distrustful of that mythical one "society" since I don't want any national state having that much power. A constituted public is made up of "a particular telos, circumscribed by constitutive practice, and underwritten by normative convictions." At a local level, a public would be justified to interfere if these three characteristics were being violated.

    To return to more Christian terms here, a local polity might be justified to force a person to give some portion of their wealth if that's person hoarding was clearly robbing the whole community of shalom, seemed to be abandoning many persons to starvation and disease, and had incensed the shared sense of fairness and justice of that community. Of course, there might be any number of better ways to fix the problem than taxing a very powerful miser.

    I'd rather see, for instance, gracious giving on the part of those who have to those who need, such as what Paul urged on the Corinthian church on behalf of the Jerusalem church, as he stressed "without compulsion" because compulsion doesn't help build the virtue of gratitude and generosity.

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  10. Since I am not quite as eloquent as you are, then it is sometimes hard for me to find common ground when speaking from different perspectives, which is why I was trying to make a clear distinction in awkward wording earlier, between the preaching perspective and the policy perspective.

    In exhortation, or preaching, we must make assumptions about God and teach accordingly. I am all for that; I am all for saying "when you set your life's goals, remember that God gave you life, and you are accountable to Him, not just to yourself." When we stand before God, we must remember that God created us with a purpose, and He will hold us accountable for how we used our lives.

    But for policy purposes we cannot do this, because of the subjectivity of such claims and the potential plurality which would ensue. Unless we want to live in a Theocratic society, we cannot say to someone "because your life is not your own but God's, you must do X or you must not do Y!" The only reason we would be justified saying that would be if X was robbing someone of (any part of) their life. Now, God could say this to someone, and I hope He does, but I cannot (beyond merely giving my advice).

    So, yes, I am making some metaphysical assumptions about a person and about the world, but I stand ready to defend them on what I can see to be the most objective of grounds. The grounds that God created not just me, but also him and her, with each of us having a right to our own life, and only our own.

    Like you, I would also rather see gracious giving in the situation you described, and when that happens, there is no disagreement. The issue is - what if it doesn't happen, what claim can the group make on the individual. If the miser stole the money, then, yes, he should be punished and dispossessed of at least the stolen goods. But NOT BECAUSE SOCIETY NEEDS HIS WEALTH, but because he stole it. Can you imagine a society (Christian or not) where some people's need entitles(!) them to other people's stuff?? I don't want to. I don't think there would be anything Christian about that society.

    It is surprising to me that the notion of subjectively right/wrong v objectively right/wrong would be troubling to you. I guess I am not sure how Heisenberg's uncertainty principle would apply here. Can you explain a bit why that distinction is troubling to you? Do you not believe any truths to be objectively defensible?

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  11. You are far more eloquent than you give yourself credit. (Plus, I'm the one that keeps missing typos, such as "Rousseau" in the last one. :C ).

    You may be right that we keep coming back to that central issue of how the church and he state are to relate. I, too, would be worried about living in a theocracy, by the way. This is why I mentioned a principled plpuralism that seeks to build a consensus wihtout jettisoning various religious communities' belief systems.

    It does seem incumbent on us at this point to both offer a biblical and theological defense for how those things belong together. What factors do you think we would need to address? It seems the question of rights belongs in there, but also apparently the question of taxation, and maybe the basis for governing. What else am I missing?

    Could you talk to me more about the grounds you refer to? What are they, and what makes them objective?

    I threw out Heisenberg more as joke: after all, if our personal observation impacts the physical object in question, then might not our moral observation impact what we claim to be objective grounds?

    All I was really trying to say there is that our worldview does effect what we see as right and wrong, and appeals to objective good and evil tend to mask these worldview differences. I'm not denying something like natural law, but I am claiming along with the early Thomist tradition that natural law is real but subject to sinful distorttion and must be subject to course correction by the divine and eternal laws.

    Am I wrong to see you mostly operating out of a theory of rights and government that has its origins in Locke, Paine, and maybe Montesquieu?

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  12. ARRGGGHHH!! At least four typos in the last one!

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