Max Schler and an Ethics of Feeling-- Part 2

"There can be no society without a life-community (though there can be a life-community without society)."--Max Scheler

Manfred Frings in his discussion of Max Scheler's ethics traces the ethicist's distinction between a life-community and a society:

1. Natural thinking vs. conceptual thinking
2. Immediate membership (co-living) vs. contractual relations (the alien other)
3. Members not of age vs. individuals of age
4. Trust, solidarity vs. distrust
5. No criteria for truth vs. criteria for truth
6. Life-values vs. divisible values
7. Duration vs. no duration
8. Territory vs. non-spatial relations

There is much to disagree with in this list, though there is much to commend about Scheler's overall observational structure. he understands life-communities to be much more organic, to grow out of natural relationships, and therefore to be more stable, conservative, and personal. People are born into life-communities, and thus, they are nurtured to accept many conceptions of the world without critical reflection.

On the other hand, societies lack the trust that forms the basis of a life-communities because they are made up of multiple communities. Instead of natural relationships, they must be based on concepts that hold adult individuals together, and their differences are negotiated legally through contracts. Thus, they lack the durability of communities, and they tend to lack the geographic center that holds a community together.

I think Scheler overlooks how communities do have implicit good and methods by which they pursue and adjudicate those goods. I would also argue that the truths that supposedly hold societies together arise out of previous life-communities and their belief structures, and when these truths are divorced from the organic practices that originate them, they quickly become vapid over a few generations.

Scheler also holds that along with life-communities and societies, there exist "all encompassing persons" (Gesamtperson) who in religious, cultural, and political expressions represent comprehensive identities that create solidarity in people otherwise separated by life-communities and even national borders. Such persons (or perhaps one can say, personhoods) bring together the experiences and insights of the life-community and the society. Yet Scheler also seems to use the concept to point to individuals who radically change the ideals and directions of people. They sum up in themselves some key element of the Gesamtperson. The Buddha, Picasso, and Napoleon represent each type respectively.