Max Scheler and an Ethics of Feeling--Part 1

"Whoever has the ordo amoris of man, has man himself. He has for man as a moral subject what the crystallization formula is for crystal. He sees through him as far as one possibly can. He sees before him the constantly simple and basic lines of his heart running beneath all empirical many-sidedness and complexity. And heart deserves to be called the core of man as a spiritual being much more so than knowing and willing."--Maz Scheler (trans. Manfred Frings)

The German ethicist and phenomenologist Max Scheler worked all his life on a theory of ethical personalism that influenced Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II) in both positive and negative ways. Scheler's emphasis on a rich description of the subjective emotions of human beings was a method quite conducive to the philosophical and artistic Wojtyla, and as I will try to recount in future posts, and impacted Wojtyla's stress on human feeling and human value. At the same time, Scheler's descriptive project ultimately downplayed the importance of human choice, a stress absolutely necessary to the thought of John Paul II, as well as eventually rejecting theism for a more pantheistic belief in an evolving ground of being with both spirit (Geist) and force (Drang), a position the late pope could also not embrace. Nonetheless, some knowledge of Scheler's hierarchy of values and intersubjectivity is helpful in understanding how he shaped some of Wotjyla's early thought.

Scheler felt that feelings are fundamentally basic, that they have priority to our thoughts and choices. Our hearts tell us something about our values before our minds begin to conceptualize them. He categorized value-feelings (the order of loves) in the following way:

1. Holiness: the highest value-feeling. I suspect he meant something here not unlike Rudolf Ott's mysterium tremendum.
   
2. The mind's values: aesthetic (beauty); juridical (rightness); philosophical (truth).
3. Life-values or vitals: those values that are felt either within one's own body of as appearances in external objects.
4. Utility: all animals experience that something is needed or not needed.
5. Sensations: the lowest feelings, such as comfort, pleasure, and so on.

Our feelings, felt Scheler, have an inherent drift, for example, towards comfort, beauty, and order. The higher values are more durable, so they are also more fulfilling. They also, then, impart a sense of "oughtness" to particular actions. This sense of kairos, by which Scheler meant inner moral guidance, creates a feeling of the moment in which one's heart, mind, and will converge around the ethical decision. This does not mean that a sense of moral guidance in our feelings can be reduced to one's passions, for distortions of the values can arise.

Scheler also held that the person should be understood as found in one's actions. Each of us has the very early experience of separation from others, as well as subsequent feelings that connect us with others. He also categorized these:

1. "Caught" feelings that people share simply by being in the same place together. This is the experience of the mob.
2. "Fellow" feelings that people naturally share by living with another. This is the experience of the life-community.
3. "Joint" feelings are common feelings that people experience together. These do not occur naturally but are willed by people on the basis of moral principles; thus, they are the ideal basis of a society.
4. Feelings of emotive identification in which the experience is entirely collective are experienced in religious mysticism. Church members often combine the solidarity of the life community with sense of an all-inclusive personhood (Gesamtperson) of shared unity.

In my next post, I will explore further how Scheler distinguishes life-communities and societies, as well as how this gives rise to both perceptions of the divine and of economic and political ressentiment.