I haven't read the piece she's referencing, but I'm including below some material from a piece by Russell Hittinger on the history of modern Catholic social thought. It actually touches on part of what I was trying to say the other day about the place of communities/collectives/associations in between the state and individuals, though I had in mind more the Protestant tradition on this--Calvin, neo-Calvinism, Groetius, and so on.
"The state is not itself a societas perfecta in the classical sense of term, but a “rational and juridical machine” that assists the perfections consisting in the very sociality of the body politic. On this view, the state is not a thing or a substance, much less a large person imparting a soul to otherwise unorganized matter. Hence, we find three different notions of democracy, none of which is particularly strong in the institutional sense of the term: (1) democracy as a proto-institutional notion of political authority vested in the entire people; (2) democracy as a political regime containing popular elements: and (3) democracy in the defensive sense of popular checks upon government.
"Society, on the other hand, is not a mere instrument. It consists of plural and intrinsic forms, not “masses” to be aggregated. Here, then, we find a distinctively modern conception of external “juridical” order distinct from, and subordinate to, a richer social ontology. . . . [S]ubsidiarity presupposes that there are plural authorities and agents having their “proper” (not necessarily, lowest) duties and rights with regard to the common good. . . .
"But the principle is not so much a theory about state institutions, or about checks and balances, as it is an account of the pluralism in society. Once we distinguish subsidiarity from the similar but misleading notions of distributions, devolution, and aid, it is easier to grasp why it was introduced as an aspect of social justice. For Pius XII, social justice is that kind of order that ensues when each person is capacitated to “exercise his social munus,” to contribute to the common good according to his proper office and role. This may or may not require the giving of aid, the correction of a deficiency, or the removal of barriers to the performance of social duties, but what is always entails is respect for a pluriform social order. "
Thanks for posting this, Philip. I find the writing very hard to understand, but what I do understand is intriguing and educating since I don't know much about Catholic social thought.
ReplyDeleteI have some longer comments about Hittinger's paragraphs above, but I will withhold those for now, because I want to first find out if you (or others) know what the goal of such 'Catholic social thought' is. What is the purpose of methodical 'social thought'.
I keep coming back to my awkward language of 'preaching' perspective v. 'policy' perspective. Surely Pious XII's views on Catholic social thought were intended not as directives for how we should organize societies politically (which would require forcing(!) people to behave in the way he is advocating) but merely illuminating advice for how to act individually or how to preach these issues in congregations (which requires no force); is that about right?
I'm still pretty green on Catholic social thought myself, so I'm not sure I can answer your question, but my guess is this line of thinking is more concerned with preserving existing associations with particular traditions and rights.
ReplyDeleteBut to the question of force, would a men's club have the right to restrict their membership to men only?
Would a men's club have the right to restrict their membership to men only? I would argue - ABSOLUTELY. And the green hat school can demand that everyone wear a green hat. Just like as a private citizen I can restrict access to my house to only those people I approve of. Since my guiding light seems to be the God given right to life - then the people of the men's club can exercise their right to life by selecting to associate with individuals of their choice and not of others.
ReplyDeleteNow - my restricting access to my house, or a men's club restricting access to facilities perhaps requires force, but only in response to force already initiated. I think Christian principles would prohibit someone from attempting to forcefully enter my home, but they would permit me to use force to defend my home if someone is attempting to enter without permission.
What is your thinking on the men's club's rights?
Something pretty similar. Perhaps the only difference in emphasis might be that I would lean towards seeing that right as somehow endemic to the nature of the entity rather than it being simply a by-product of the rights of the individuals within the group, though I confess I need to thnk it through more.
ReplyDeleteWould that mean that the entity (state, church, voluntary organization) has some right that the individuals do not? What would be an example of such a right?
ReplyDeleteNot entirely sure. My intial thought is that the group right (and again we REALLY need other language here) is still a human entity that exists for human needs, but those needs by themselves are not on the surface enough to justify the solidarity of the association. For example in the men's club case, there has been a tendency to argue that a closed membership is a violation of the right to equal access, with the result being forcing the club to either change its nature or to be dissolved.
ReplyDeleteBut what if the the endemic values of male friendship and long-standing tradition can be said to justify the corporation of the club because they cannot be said to exist in purely personal, individual forms? In other words, telling the men to go find their friendship in other more limited places misses out on something in the tradition and practice of the club that is endemic to it.
Should we call this a subjective right, meaning an aspect that is integeral to the association itself over time and transcending the individuals who have and do make it up? What do you think?
What is the 'right of equal access'? I don't think I am familiar with this. If such a right exists in legal language, then I would suspect it refers not to a 'right' at all, but some perversion of that word.
ReplyDeleteI tend to think that the only rights that exist are objective(!) rights, not subjective. I do not think the association has any rights whatsoever that transcend the individuals who make it up.
With respect to the justification for any corporation - I am not certain why any justification is needed. If each individual has a right to her own life and liberty, and without doing harm to others, they decide to form a voluntary restricted access association, then that's their prerogative, isn't it? As a non-philosopher, I am sure I am using language that is too imprecise, so I appreciate your patience through these points.
"Equal access" comes out of the civil rights movement, which was then extended to feminist struggles in the U.S.
ReplyDelete"Subjective" in this case means indemic to the subject. The idea is that the right in question is somethnig that without the subject (person or group)is lessened or even violated. Objective rights means "real" or located in the larger world.
The reason would be two-fold: 1) that some would force the association to change beause it is deemed as violating the rights of excluded individuals; 2) because a long-standing association is more than voluntary. It certainly is that, but once it is has a tradition, then the current generation of its members has a responsiblity to somethng larger than themselves.
What is the 'right of equal access'?
ReplyDeleteHere's an example from the UK:
ReplyDeletehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6514997.stm
This is an interesting story. However, I am not sure it illustrates an example of a right of equal access. It seems to me that the club decided voluntarily to grant access to a new constituency. Rights language would need to be used if a group could be forced to admit members it wishes not to admit.
ReplyDeleteI would still like to see some thoughtful argument for a right of equal access, since I am not convinced that such a right can ever exist, without first stomping on some of the more basic and objective rights individuals possess - rights to their own life and the derived rights thereof.
I think I would need to research it better. To be honest I skimmed the article. But I think they did this in part because of pressure that their exclusive membership was in some way discriminatory. What I recall in this country was an insistence by women's groups that exclusive male memberships were a violation of their civil rights. Perhaps there are better examples I could use, such as a local community tradition, market, or even a university. My main point is that I'm not convinced that individual rights should always be allowed to trump an organization's right to exist and that their are aspects to this that are endemic to it as an association, though again I owe you more concrete examples.
ReplyDeleteExamples would be helpful, but I am really interested in seeing what is 'the right of an organization' and some sort of a moral philosophical argument for why that right (if it exists) would trump the rights of an individual. From Christian perspective, is there anything at all more important in the created world than the individual? Is the right of an organization (whether that organization is the Levites, the Sanhedrin, the early church congregation, or later - a denominational body) ever seen biblically as more important than each individual's right to her own life or some extension of it?
ReplyDeleteI don't know if I could furnish examples of what seems to me to be a somewhat foreign line of thought for biblical thinking, though obviously I've been willing to employ it. I do think the language of rights is rooted in the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount, for example, in that they furnish us examples of how we treat others, thereby suggesting how powers should not treat others.
ReplyDeleteI would also suggest that I'm not denying that associations exist for their members, but that there are aspects of that work which are found in the corporate life. Here, I do think I can furnish biblical examples--e.g. I Cor 12's vision of the Body being one with many diverse members. No one member's life may divorce itself from or exclude the others and their corporate purpose. I think the same kind of corporate solidarity is found in Paul's description of the church in Eph 4:11-16.
I confess I also wouldn't formulate the question as you do since I'm not convinced that all property is an extension of individuals--Isn't it finally all God's held in trust by us as his stewards? Still, I'm not sure we need think of the cases in question as always as grand as outweighing another's "life."
Still, what would you do with the death of Achan and his family? (Josh 7:1ff.)?
I think it is terrible that Achan's family were executed. I do not understand it and I don't think a rationalization can be found for it. I would, however, oppose a death penalty for thievery, if someone tried to institute such a penalty based on a Joshua 7 standard; I think that the Bible is elsewhere more clear about the sanctity of life and impermissibility of force.
ReplyDeleteI agree with you that 'the right to access' seems foreign to biblical thinking. I also agree with you that Christians should view property as a blessing from God, however, my strong stance is not against a stewardship mentality, but merely against anyone other than the individual laying claim to the individual's property. If John's money ultimately belongs to God and Joe's money ultimately belongs to God, then Joe cannot take John's money without John's permission. Even if John does not share the stewardship mentality and wants to steal Joe's money, he still must not do so. So recognizing that property is a blessing from God does not mean that private property ownership is out the window. Would a good steward of his master's talents allow a third party to take those talents while the master is away? Unequivocally "No", and that's why private property rights can peacefully coexist with a stewardship mentality. Is there a clear inconsistency in this type of thinking?
Yes, but we're not talking about Joe; we're talking about King Joe, the authorized representative of God. e.g. Psalm 72: 1-4:
ReplyDeleteEndow the king with your justice, O God,
the royal son with your righteousness.
2 He will judge your people in righteousness,
your afflicted ones with justice.
3 The mountains will bring prosperity to the people,
the hills the fruit of righteousness.
4 He will defend the afflicted among the people
and save the children of the needy;
he will crush the oppressor.
Of course, for every legitimate King Joe, there's probably several Faux-King Joe Stalins who oppress the poor in the name of "justice." (I do hope by the end of the week to post my answer to the question of government redistribution of wealth and whether it can ever be biblical. I need some time to decide how to put it up without being too wordy.)
P.S. I don't understand the Achan example either. That's another day's discussion.
You bring up a good point. I certainly have unresolved difficulty in finding a suitable middle ground between individual rights based view and submission to authority view, which both seem to be very much biblical to me. I am not willing to sacrifice on individual liberties, but - you are right - this is not consistent with the calls for submission to authority which you have pointed out in Romans 13, or Luke 20:25 and other passages.
ReplyDeleteI do want to point out though, that such a call for 'redistribution' (or a weakening of private property) if we were to arrive at it would NOT come from a moral philosophical fairness argument (i.e. an argument that having a NEED justifies taking of property) but rather on an authoritative argument related to submitting to authority. The 'forceful' Aquinas (I liked your use of pun!), at least in your quote, followed the moral ethical needs based argument. I am not saying that an authoritative argument cannot be made, I am just clarifying that the argument has a slightly different basis than the one that we have been discussing.
I'd like to learn more about this middle ground, too. I wonder if earlier Christian thinkers on rights-- John of Salisbury, John Wycliffe, John Knox, Suarez, Grotius--might help us here. I do agree that the rights and responsibilities of individuals are essential to any Christian reflection on government. ANyway, I'll save more on this until we summarize our discussion under a new blog entry.
ReplyDelete